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Give us the proudest prisoner of the Goths,
That we may hew his limbs and on a pile
[To the shade of our brothers] sacrifice his flesh
Before this early prision of their bones,
That so the shadows be not unappeased,
Nor we disturbed with prodigies on earth.
—William Shakespeare1
INTRODUCTION
The only witness to the bloodshed was a mutilated image of Christ laid on
the floor among bodies of men, women and children.2 On May 2, 2002, a
rudimentary mortar used by the Guerillas landed on a church where hundreds of
civilians sought shelter during an armed encounter between rebel fighters and
paramilitary units.3 The massacre occurred in Bojayá, a small and extremely

*
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the Law, Engineer and Design Schools to create a new generation of judicial solutions to enhance access
to justice in Colombia. Also, Head of the Office for Data Analysis & Strategic Studies at the City of
Bogota’s Department of Security and Justice. The author would like to express his sincere gratitude to
Professor Robert W. Gordon, Professor Lawrence M. Friedman, Diego Gil McCawley, Professor Zachary
Kaufman, Nicolás Torres, Juan David Camacho, and Sophia Cai. The interviews conducted in Colombia
as part of this research were possible thanks to the generous support of the Stanford Center for Latin
American Studies Field Research Grant. The qualitative research in this Article would not have been
possible without the generosity of all those who gracefully agreed to be interviewed. The quantitative
research would not have been possible without the extraordinary help of Harvey Suárez, the technical
secretary of the Selection Commission, who provided the author with the raw data of the applications
submitted in the process for selecting the judges of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace. Finally, the author
would like to recognize the wonderful advice and priceless assistance of Lara Thiele and Brad A.
Rocheville of the Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law and their team of editors.
1
TITUS ANDRONICUS 1.1.99–104 (Jonathan Bate ed. 2018).
2
Armando Neira, ¿Cómo Fue la Masacre de Bojayá?, SEMANA (May 13, 2002, 12:00 AM),
https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/como-fue-la-tragedia-de-bojaya/50635-3.
3
Martin Hodgson, Colombians find massacre evidence, The Guardian (February 6, 2019, 2:35 PM),
https://bit.ly/2Gcqkoj.
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poor Afro-Colombian village located on the Colombian Pacific coast.4 The
town, historically neglected by the Government, was at the time a strategic
corridor for illegal smuggling of drugs and arms.5 The explosion killed 79 people
and left almost 100 seriously injured. Unfortunately, more than half of the
casualties were children.6
On December 6, 2015, a delegation of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed
Forces (FARC) lead by the guerrilla commander Pastor Alape visited what
remained of the church as part of a public forgiveness ceremony.7 Mr. Alape, on
the steps of the building, addressed a group of 700 survivors of the Bojayá
Massacre.8 In the speech, while accepting partial responsibility for what
occurred, he recognized that his speech was not enough to compensate the
victims for the tremendous damage cause by the actions of the FARC9. For its
part, the representatives of the victims of Bojayá acknowledged that the guerrilla
group was not the only one responsible for the massacre. In a reply to Mr.
Alape’s speech, the chairman of the Victim’s Committee of Bojayá announced
that the events were the result of a fatal combination of the State’s historical
abandonment of the region, the paramilitary’s decision to use the civilian
population as human shields, and the guerrilla’s outrageous use of an improvised
mortar in order to repel the attack.10
The Bojayá Massacre is one of the most emblematic tragedies of the
Colombian civil war.11 Its cruelty and the widespread responsibility among all
the parties in the conflict, evokes a difficult question: where do you draw the
line between peace and justice? As the ceremony described above shows, war
produces profound wounds in society and claims of justice are complicated and
numerous.

4
The town of Bojayá is located in the State of Chocó. According to the Colombian National Bureau
of Planification, the State’s poverty index of 68.3% ranks first in the country. DEPARTAMENTO NACIONAL
DE PLANEACIÓN, POBREZA MONETARIA Y POBREZA MULTIDIMENSIONAL: ANÁLISIS 2010–2017, at 12
(2018),
https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Desarrollo%20Social/Pobreza%20Monetaria%20y%20Multidime
nsional%20en%20Colombia%202010-2017.pdf.
5
Antony Barnett, Price of Cocaine Paid with Blood, GUARDIAN (Feb. 13, 2005),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/feb/13/drugsandalcohol.colombia.
6
Kirk Semple, With Colombia’s Peace Deal in Doubt, a Battered Town Fears a Return to War, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/11/world/americas/colombia-peace-deal.html.
7
Armando Neira, FARC Piden Perdón en Bojayá por la Massacre del 2002, SEMANA (Dec. 6, 2015),
https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/farc-piden-perdon-en-bojaya-por-la-masacre-de-2002/4526013.
8
Francisco de Roux, Actos de Reconciliación, EL TIEMPO (Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.eltiempo.com
/archivo/documento/CMS-16453378.
9
Mr. Alape said, “we [the FARC] know that these words are not enough to compensate what is
beyond compensation. No action we can undertake will return to the victims the loved ones they lost and
will not blur the pain and suffering produced.” United Nations [U.N.], Pastor Alape’s Speech During the
Act of Recognition of Responsibility of the FARC at Bojayá, YOUTUBE (Mar. 12, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1jQF7mz3LuI (translated from Spanish by the author).
10
Caracol News, Pastor Alape Recognizes Responsibility to Victims of the Bojayá Massacre,
YOUTUBE (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=109Ys0RWbh0 (translated from Spanish
by the author).
11
In its report about the Bojayá Massacre, the Center for National Memory concludes that the events
around the massacre “mark the history of Colombia and its characteristics have made it an emblematic
case of the dynamics of violence around the armed conflict.” GONZALO SÁNCHEZ ET AL., BOJAYÁ: LA
GUERRA SIN LÍMITES 25 (2010), http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/informes/publicacionespor-ano/2010/bojaya-la-guerra-sin-limites-2 (translated from Spanish by the author).
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Transitional Justice tries to answer this question through overlapping,
diverging and, in certain occasions, contradictory solutions.12 As Shakespeare
teaches in Titus Andronicus, private vengeance will always become
unmanageable if law does not contain it, because violence never evens the odds
among parties in conflict.13 In this sense, it is necessary to accept that
Transitional Justice is a broad term that includes a universe of concurring and
conflicting themes.14 Generally, at the heart of discussions concerning
transitional justice are questions about the type of objectives a society should
pursue after a conflict ends.15 These dilemmas can be summarized in the
following two questions: (1) Is it necessary and feasible to punish all the
perpetrators of mass crimes? (2) If so, should the punishment conceived only
hold the guilty accountable or should it also contribute to wider reconciliation
objectives? These are profound and difficult questions that must be addressed in
a prompt manner by arbiters of transitional justice.16
Further, there is also a third relevant but unattended question: who must be
the one responsible for judging crimes in transitional justice systems? In other
words, studies on the subject have widely reviewed what happens before and
after transitional justice models are created to resolve an armed civil or political
conflict. Yet, they have stopped short of analyzing the selection processes and
appointment criteria of the judges who will have to bear this very important
responsibility.
The academic analysis around transitional justice legal institutions has not
concentrated on the selection process of the judges who will have to answer
complicated questions regarding peace and justice. Authors like Alex Schwartz

12
An example of this is the Rwandan case. After the Tutsi Genocide, the United Nations sponsored
the creation of an international tribunal to pursue and punish the main perpetrators. However, the
Rwandan government—inspired by the country’s traditional tribal conciliation process and pressed by
the international community to take action—promoted the creation of the Gacaca Courts. These Courts
were composed by inyangamugayo (wise and respected leaders) with no legal training who were
appointed by popular vote. Gacaca coexisted with the national judiciary and its principal mission was to
confront the perpetrators in public hearings and impose an alternative punishment, even for those accused
of genocide whose cases were also referred to the national judicial system or the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda. See generally PHIL CLARK, THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA 1–27 (2010).
13
KENJI YOSHINO, A THOUSAND TIMES MORE FAIR: WHAT SHAKESPEARE’S PLAYS TEACH US
ABOUT JUSTICE 4 (2012).
14
For example, there is an entire field of study within transitional justice that tries to promote a unified
theory of the concept. However, even in these scholarly efforts there is an acknowledgement that there
are at least two types of transitional justice. The first one refers to models of historic justice put in place
by established democracies that try to readdress abuses from the past. The other one relates to the practices
of judicial adjudication developed by countries emerging from war or autocratic governments. This
illustrates the difficulties of trying to consolidate a single doctrinal model for transitional justice. See
Stephen Winter, Towards a Unified Theory of Transitional Justice, 7 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 224,
224–227 (2013).
15
COLLEEN MURPHY, THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 11–20 (2017).
16
See, e.g., Makau Mutua, Republic of Kenya Report of the Task Force on the Establishment of a
Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission, 10 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 15, 169 (2004). Transitional
justice involves a “’set of inter-related principles and processes centered’ around the imagined role of law
and law-making ‘in constituting transition’ toward a range of goals and ends. These goals and ends can
include, amongst others: the restoration of the ‘rule of law’; judicial retribution designed to counter a
culture of impunity; recompense and the restoration of dignity to victims; reform of institutions; social
and political reconciliation; ‘nation-building’ and the re-constitution of the past on the basis of ‘shared
narrative’.” Patricia Lundy & Mark McGovern, Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice from the
Bottom Up, 35 J. L. & SOC’Y 265, 267 (2008).
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and Melanie Murchinson17 have written abundantly about the politics behind the
decision-making process inside Courts.18 Likewise, Lawrence Freidman19 has
conducted extended research around the power dynamics related to jury
selection and other forms of appointments within the judiciary.20 However, the
recent Colombian experience presents a unique opportunity to quantitatively and
qualitatively study the judicial selection process in transitional justice contexts.
With these ideas in mind, this Article intends to present the history of how
Colombian society has recently tried to answer the hard questions related to this
issue. The SJP presents an opportunity to examine a revolutionary proposal to
form Transitional Justice tribunals.21 As it will be explained in the following
section, the Peace Agreement conceived a unique but untested way to appoint
the judges of the SJP. Conventionally, the way of appointing judges for this type
of institution has been a top-down approach.22 This approach involved the
selection of justices from the rank and file of victors in wars (like in the case of
the International Military Tribunals created in Nuremberg and Tokyo after
World War II), through the United Nations Security Council (for the case of the
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda) or by
International Bodies comprised only by States (like the case of the Assembly of
State Parties of the Rome Statute regarding the International Criminal Court).23
In contrast, for the first time, the selection process of the judges of the SJP
was conducted by an independent committee appointed by third parties
designated by the Colombian Government and the FARC.24 Also, unlike the vast
majority of transitional justice institutions, only Colombian lawyers were
appointed to the new Tribunal25 and the selection process was executed through

17
Alex Schwartz & Melanie Janelle Murchison, Judicial Impartiality and Independence in Divided
Societies: An Empirical Analysis of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 50 L. & SOC’Y REV.
821 (2016).
18
Id.
19
Lawrence M. Friedman, Benchmarks: Judges on Trial, Judicial Selection and Election, 58 DEPAUL
L. REV. 451 (2009).
20
Id.
21
Juan Orozco, A Closer Look at Colombia´s Special Jurisdiction for Peace, FRANCE 24 (Jan. 14,
2019), https://www.france24.com/en/20190114-focus-colombia-special-jurisdiction-peace-process-farcguerrilla-civil-war-tribunal-justice.
22
Davis R. Robinson, The Role of Politics in the Election and the Work of Judges of the International
Court of Justice, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 277 (2003).
23
For details of the selection process in these Courts, see Agreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis art. 2, Aug. 8 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 59
Stat. 1544 (Nuremberg Charter) and Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 37, July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (Rome Statute).
24
For a more detailed account on the conformation of the Selection Committee, see infra Chapter 2.
25
See Laura Íñigo Álvarez, The Special Jurisdiction for Peace in Colombia: Challenges and
Opportunities for Accountability, Ucall (Apr. 9, 2018), http://blog.ucall.nl/index.php/2018/04/thespecial-jurisdiction-for-peace-in-colombia-challenges-and-opportunities-for-accountability/. This was a
contentious point of the peace agreement. The original accord provided that the SJP was going to be
composed of 38 Colombian judges and ten foreign judges. However, the agreement was rejected by a thin
margin in a plebiscite held on October 2, 2016. After the defeat, the government was forced to renegotiate
the agreements with the political opposition who, during the plebiscite campaign, constantly asserted that
one of the main problems of the agreement was the selection of foreign judges to the SJP. For them, this
translated to an unacceptable affront to the country’s sovereignty. The new agreement, signed by the
parties on November 2016 and approved by the Colombian Congress the following month, eliminated
any reference to foreign judges as a concession to the accord’s opposition. See Office of the Colombian
High Commissioner for Peace, Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and
Lasting Peace, Nov. 24, 2016 [hereinafter Peace Agreement].
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an online platform that was open to public comments regarding the candidates’
qualifications and proficiency.26 Further, the Peace Agreement included clear
formal criteria—related specifically to affirmative action in favor of
minorities—that served as the guideline for the selection process of the
justices.27 Understanding the way those orchestrating judicial appointments to
the SJP applied this abstract formal criterion not only exemplifies the impact of
this new experiment on transitional justice but also helps answer a broader
question about judicial independence in transitional scenarios. Courts are
institutions run by human beings, so they are affected by subjective influences.28
Because of this, judicial independence is not directly observable. Thus,
empirical studies have to rely on certain proxies to evaluate independence.29 One
of the more common and reliable proxies is the appointment process, because in
these scenarios the profile of a particular court is molded.30 The filters applied
in this process are key elements used to determine the kind of institution the
Special Jurisdiction for Peace is destined to be in the future.
This Article outlines the trials and tribulations surrounding the selection
process for the SJP.31 In the heat of the current political debate concerning the
implementation of the Peace Agreement, it is important to understand the origin
of the institution that has the extraordinary challenge of closing, in a judicial
sense at least, this chapter of violence in Colombia’s history.
Currently, the legitimacy of the SJP is questioned by many political groups
that oppose recognizing it as a fundamental gear of the country’s political
transition.32 In fact, even the existence of the SJP is in peril as the last
presidential election dramatically changed the distribution of power. Now, those
sectors who opposed the Peace Agreement won the election.33 These sectors

26
For purposes of the process, the webpage www.comitedeescogencia.com was created. COMITE DE
ESCOGENCIA, http://www.comitedeescogencia.com/ (last accessed Apr. 26, 2019). All the applications
were submitted through that webpage.
27
For a description of the constitutional provision enacting the criteria, see infra Chapter 2.
28
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL PERSONAE 3–5 (2015).
29
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Is Judicial Independence a Useful Concept?, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 45 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman
eds., 2002).
30
Id.
31
Peace Agreement, supra note 25.
32
For example, the right-leaning Democratic Center political party constantly used social media to
frame attacks against the SJP based on uncorroborated rumors and fake news. Deceptive Campaigns of
the Democratic Center Against JEP, EL ESPECTADOR (Feb. 2, 2019), https://colombia2020.
elespectador.com/jep/las-campanas-enganosas-del-centro-democratico-contra-la-jep.
33
Iván Duque Escobar, a young Colombian senator who is part of a right-wing coalition that has
systematically opposed the terms of the Peace Agreement, won the 2018 presidential election. In a recent
interview, when questioned about the results of the selection process of the justices of the SJP, Mr. Duque
replied with the following: “I believe that the selection process of the SJP sponsored the appointment of
certain people that have more merits as political activists than as prominent legal scholars..”. Julio
Sánchez Cristo, El Verdadero Duque, EL TIEMPO (Apr. 28, 2018), https://www.eltiempo.com/bocas/
entrevista-de-bocas-al-candidato-ivan-duque-210116 (translated from Spanish by the author). Obviously,
this generates a lot of suspicions, negative hunches and concerns.” In the same interview, Mr. Duque even
questioned those responsible for appointing the judges. On this matter he said the following: “I also think
that the parties committed a mistake in the design of the selection process when it allowed a former judge
of the Inter-American Human Rights Court to participate in the deliberations and decisions regarding
these appointments. This person, who on several occasions in the past decided against the Colombian
State for events that could be examined again under the jurisdiction of the SJP, had a clear conflict of
interest.”. Id.
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have openly denounced the creation of the Tribunal and have suggested that it
be dissolved.34
That said, this work is not a political vindication of the SJP, nor a response
to the opposition critics against the Peace Agreement, nor an assessment of the
Tribunal’s independence in practice. Although there are a myriad of
controversies surrounding the Court, as of the time of writing, the SJP has yet to
decide its first case. Therefore, there is no information that allows researchers to
fully address these important questions. That is why these discussions, though
valuable, are not relevant for the purposes of this research. Instead, the findings
and conclusions presented here seek to be an input for a more qualified
discussion of the consolidation of peace in Colombia. Also, this Article is not
about the construction of social and legal legitimacy in times of transition. Of
course, courts that have the enormous task of assessing the responsibility for
mass atrocities require robust support from civil society to function properly.
The process of selecting judges is the initial milestone needed to achieve this
goal. Yet, the acceptance of the Tribunal in the social fabric of the country will
take time. That is why, given that this work evaluates a concrete timeframe for
SJP’s creation process, the discussions involving this subject are deliberately
omitted.35
The second Part of this Article includes a background of the Colombian civil
war as well as the context of the Peace Agreement signed in 2016 between the
State and the FARC. It also surveys the transitional justice model set by the 2016
Peace Agreement and gives a detailed explanation of the formal criteria that the
Accord provided for the SJP judicial selection process. The third Part presents a
qualitative study of the selection process that draws from ten interviews
conducted in Colombia. This Part describes the experiences of those who were
directly involved in the selection of the SJP. The interviewees include the Peace
Agreement’s political opponents, commissioners of the Selection Committee
(SC) in charge of appointing the members of the new SJP institutions, and
judicial candidates applying to sit on this Court.
The fourth Part presents the findings of a quantitative methodology that
evaluates the raw data obtained from all the applications received by the SC’s
online selection process platform. That Part evaluates the CVs of the candidates
through a 69-variable codebook.36 The findings are then presented to understand
how the Commissioners understood and applied the formal selection criteria.
Finally, the last Part will present conclusions regarding this study’s quantitative

34
In October 2017, a group of senators from the Democratic Center Party—led by the main leader of
the opposition, former President of Colombia Álvaro Uribe Vélez—filed a petition to the Colombian
Electoral Commission that sought to call for a national referendum to revoke the SJP.
35
However, it goes without saying that the first months of the SJP have been turbulent, to say the
least. In April 2017, the Secretary of the Tribunal in charge of the administrative and logistical
organization of the Court resigned, alleging an internal struggle among the justices for the control of the
budget. The Chief Justice of the SJP denied these allegations and accused the Secretary of mishandling
money and procuring inadequate equipment that hindered the normal work of the Court. As of June, 2017,
the Court remains understaffed and, according to some Colombian news outlets, there is a shortage of
basic supplies such as paper and ink. Diana Durán, Una Pelea Que Opaca a la JEP, EL ESPECTADOR
(Apr. 27, 2018, 9:00 PM), https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/una-pelea-que-opaca-la-jeparticulo-752622.
36
The codebook can be found in Appendix B of the research proposal.
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and qualitative findings and offers potential paths and directions for further
research in the field.
I. BACKGROUND
A famous English historian described Colombia as a Nation in Spite of
Itself.37 There is no consensus, among scholars, about the moment when the
current five decades-long conflict started, but two main theories can be
identified.38 One theory, championed by foreign scholars such as Daniel Pécaut,
traces the birth of the war to April, 1948 when the liberal leader Jorge Eliécer
Gaitán, an anti-establishment politician with popular support among peasants
and blue-collar workers, was killed.39 The assassination sprouted profound civil
unrest with mass protests in the main cities of the country, especially in the
capital Bogotá, where public confrontations between the Armed Forces and the
protesters ended with an untold number of deaths and the destruction of most of
the city’s infrastructure.40 This event gave rise to sectarian political violence
between the Liberal and Conservative parties—the main parties in power in
Colombia—that later was named La Violencia (The Violence).41
The other theory, advanced most prominently by Colombian social
scientists like Jorge Orlando Melo, recognizes the effect of La Violencia in the
creation of the first guerilla groups in the country, but sets the starting point of
the conflict in 1964.42 That was the year when the FARC was founded by Manuel
Marulanda Vélez. Marulanda Vélez was a peasant leader who cofounded an
independent republic in Southern Colombia as a reaction to the State’s violence
against liberal and communist leaders and the excessive concentration of land in
the hands of the political and economic elite.
Whatever its origins, for over 50 years, the country has faced a bloody
and cruel civil conflict.43 Some of the most conservative studies have estimated
that the total death toll of the war may be 220,000.44 Further, the majority of the
casualties have been civilians. It is estimated that approximately 81% of those
killed in the conflict are non-combatant civilians.45 This represents, according to
the data collected by the government’s Center for National Memory, around

37
DAVID BUSHNELL, THE MAKING OF MODERN COLOMBIA: A NATION IN SPITE OF ITSELF vii-x
(1993).
38
MARCO PALACIOS, BETWEEN LEGITIMACY AND VIOLENCE: A HISTORY OF COLOMBIA, 1875-2002,
at 135–169 (2006).
39
DANIEL PÉCAUT, ORDEN Y VIOLENCIA: COLOMBIA 1930-1953 (1987).
40
HERBERT BRAUN, THE ASSASSINATION OF GAITÁN: PUBLIC LIFE AND URBAN VIOLENCE IN
COLOMBIA 3–11 (1985).
41
ROBERT A. KARL, FORGOTTEN PEACE: REFORM, VIOLENCE, AND THE MAKING OF THE
CONTEMPORARY COLOMBIA 1–15 (2017).
42
JORGE ORLANDO MELO, HISTORIA MÍNIMA DE COLOMBIA (2017).
43
ANNETTE IDLER, BORDERLAND BATTLES: VIOLENCE, CRIME AND GOVERNANCE AT THE EDGES OF
COLOMBIA’S WAR 123–57 (2019).
44
CENTRO NACIONAL DE MEMORIA HISTÓRICA, DEPARTAMENTO ADMINISTRATIVO PARA LA
PROSPERIDAD SOCIAL, INFORME GENERAL DE MEMORIA Y CONFLICTO ¡BASTA YA! COLOMBIA:
MEMORIAS DE GUERRA Y DIGNIDAD 32 (2013).
45
Id.
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180,000 civilian victims.46 In other words, as a civilian the probability of being
a victim in the Colombian conflict was approximately nine times higher than a
military or a guerrilla member. To put it in context, according to the United
Nations the global average annual murder rate for 2012, the year the peace
negotiation between the government and the FARC started, was 6.2 murders per
100,000 inhabitants.47 For that same year, the average in Colombia was 31.3
murders per 100,000 inhabitants.48
Since the beginning of the conflict, peace has been an elusive goal for
Colombians.49 The Government and the FARC formally initiated at least two
peace processes with no results before the current agreement was signed.50 The
first peace talks were held in the 1980’s and ended with the signing of the
Acuerdos de la Uribe, named after the Colombian town where the agreement
was signed.51 This Accord contemplated a bilateral cease fire and the creation of
the Unión Patriótica, a political movement formed by guerrilla members and
different representatives of the civil society, such as union and peasant leaders.52
However, the agreement collapsed after only one year of implementation.53
Systematic violations of the cease fire by both parties, armed pressured against
voters committed by the guerrillas and, most notoriously, the extermination of
the Unión Patriótica by paramilitary groups with strong ties to the military54, set
the conditions for the processes failure.55
The second peace process started in 1998.56 On October 14 of that year, the
Colombian Government, then lead by the conservative President Andrés
Pastrana, created a 42,000-square kilometer demilitarized zone—similar in size
to Denmark or The Netherlands—in the south of the country to foster peace
negotiations.57 Five months later, President Pastrana and Manuel Marulanda
Vélez signed the Acuerdo de Caquetenia where a time frame was set to sign a
Peace Agreement by the end of the year.58 During the negotiations, there were a
few advancements, such as a prisoner exchange and the agreement on a very

46

Id.
U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS AND CRIME [UNODC], GLOBAL STUDY ON HOMICIDE 2013: TRENDS,
CONTEXTS, DATA, at 12, U.N. Sales No. 14.IV.1 (2014).
48
Id. at 24.
49
Robert A. Karl, Here’s the Century-Long History Behind Colombia’s Peace Agreement with the
FARC,
WASH. POST
(Oct.
1,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2016/10/01/heres-the-century-long-history-behind-colombias-peace-agreement-with-thefarc/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f83af98b8ec5.
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limited Christmas cease fire.59 However, the parties were incapable of reaching
important settlements about international supervision, a permanent and bilateral
cease fire, nor a compromise from FARC to end the kidnapping of civilians as a
source of revenue.60 Also, those years involved a radical expansion of
paramilitary groups that opposed the peace process.61 After several problems,
on February 20, 2002, President Pastrana ended the negotiations and ordered the
Armed Forces to claim the DMZ.62
This spiral of violence only worsened until a ray of hope appeared on the
horizon: after almost two years of secret exploratory meetings between delegates
of the Government and FARC, the President of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos,
announced publicly on September 2012 that formal peace talks were beginning
in Havana, Cuba.63
After four years of negotiations, on August 24, 2016, the Colombian
Government signed a peace agreement with FARC to end the 50-year civil
conflict.64 This ongoing Accord has been the most successful peace attempt to
date. Proof of this is that the agreement is currently being implemented by the
parties. Nevertheless, the implementation has not been not without difficulties.65
A central part of the Agreement conceived a System of Truth, Justice,
Reparation and Non-Repetition.66 Under this system, the Special Jurisdiction for
Peace (SJP) was established as the cornerstone of the transitional justice
system.67 This Jurisdiction for Peace, based on the terms of the Agreement, was
conceived as the institution that will exercise judicial functions, fulfilling the
duty of the Colombian state to investigate, prosecute and punish crimes
committed in the context of and due to the armed conflict, particularly the most
serious and significant.68
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By definition of the Agreement, the SJP69 consists of a Special Prosecution
Office, three Judicial Chambers and a Peace Tribunal (PT).70 This Tribunal’s
mission is to administer justice by investigating, clarifying, prosecuting and
punishing serious human rights violations and serious violations of international
humanitarian law.71 As part of the implementation process, Congress enacted a
Constitutional Amendment in April 2017 to establish the SJP. As provided for
in the Amendment, the SJP is divided into five main components. First, the
Special Prosecution Office (SPO) is in charge of collecting evidence and
presenting charges against the main perpetrators of human rights violations.72
The SPO has the authority to decide which claims to bring first to the SJP.73 For
example, recently the head of the Office announced that he was going to
prioritize cases involving sexual violence against women and the forced
recruitment of minors.74 Also, and more importantly, the constitutional reform
incorporated a provision, based on the terms of the Accord, stating that the
conformation of the SJP had to follow a differential balance in favor of women,
ethnic communities and regional representatives.75
Second, the Chamber for the Recognition of Truth and Responsibilities
(CRTR) is the entry point to the system.76 First, an individual must acknowledge
responsibility for a crime under the SJP’s jurisdiction.77 Alternatively, there
must be credible information indicating that a person is responsible for a serious
violation of human rights law or international human rights law.78 Second, the
CRTR will separate the more serious and significant cases from those of a
political nature that can be pardoned.79 In the latter cases, the Chamber of Pardon
and Amnesty (CPA) will grant a formal pardon. In the former, the Chamber of
Definition of Judicial Situations (CDJS) will determine if the case can be subject
to any form of alternative punishment—pecuniary or symbolic reparations for
example—and then be dismissed. Further, the CDJS will determine whether a
case must be submitted to the Peace Tribunal for investigation.80
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Finally, the Peace Tribunal (PT) itself is divided into five sub-sections. The
first sub-section is responsible for judging—in the first instance—those cases
where the accused has accepted responsibility.81 In such cases, the section can
impose a sentence of between five to eight years and may determine alternative
restrictions on liberty beyond prison time.82 In contrast, in those cases where
there is not any acceptance of responsibility, the second sub-section can impose
sanctions between 15 to 20 years in prison without any alternative sanction.83
The third sub-section works as an appeals chamber for the first and second
sections in case any accused individual submits a petition for appeal.84 The
fourth sub-section is in charge of reviewing any case previously resolved by the
ordinary criminal system and determines if it can be also considered by the Peace
Tribunal.85 Once the term of the Tribunal is fulfilled—both the Peace Accord
and Constitutional Amendment establish that the Tribunal will work for 15
years—a fifth sub-section will be created.86 This chamber—known as the
Stability and Efficacy Chamber (SEC)—will ensure that all the sanctions
imposed by the PT are effectively observed.87 Also, in extraordinary cases, the
chamber will judge actions committed before the Peace Agreement was ratified
that were not resolved by the SJP.88
There were only four formal limitations imposed on being eligible to serve
as a judge for any of the components and chambers of the SJP. The first one, as
explained in the introduction, was related to nationality.89 Only Colombian
lawyers were able to submit their application during the selection process.90 The
second limitation was that each candidate had to have ten years of legal
experience to be eligible for the CRTR, CPA and CDJS.91 For the PT, candidates
had to have 15 or more years of experience.92 Both conditions were addedd
explicitly in the Peace Agreement and the Amendment that inserted the SJP in
the Colombian Constitution.93 The third rule was introduced by the SC itself.94
It allowed candidates to apply for either the Chambers or the Tribunal but not
both. According to Commissioner Hemingway, 95 this decision was conceived
as a way to divide the revision work in a more efficient way and to avoid the
perception that the Chambers were a “consolation prize.”96 The idea of the SC
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was to give both seats the same relevance and importance in the process.97 The
last criterion was related to the expertise of the candidates. The Agreement
provided that although the candidates could be experts in any area of law, all of
them had to have high qualifications and expertise in Human Rights,
International Humanitarian Law and Conflict Resolution.98 However, originally,
the Peace Accord did not contemplate any design for selecting the SJP judges.99
This is why the parties signed an addendum on August 12, 2016, where they
agreed that the SC would be constituted by third parties that would be in charge
of appointing the 51 judges of the SJP.100 Following the terms of this agreement,
the Commission was to be composed of the following members: (i) one member
appointed by the Colombian Supreme Court; (ii) one member appointed by the
European Court of Human Rights; (iii) one member appointed by the Colombian
System of Public Universities; (iv) one member appointed by the Secretary
General of the United Nations; and (v) one member appointed by the
International Centre for Transitional Justice.101
After the failed plebiscite, the new Peace Accord was submitted to the
Colombian Congress for its approval.102 On November 30, 2016, the Congress
ratified the Agreement and its implementation officially started.103 On January
26, 2017, the Supreme Court appointed Justice José Francisco Acuña Vizcaya
as its representative to the SC.104105 The next day, Antonio Guterres—Secretary
General of the United Nations—announced that Diego García-Sayan—a former
Minister of Justice of Peru who also served as the UN Special Rapporteur for
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Judicial Independence and as Chief Justice of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights—was designated as the UN envoy to the SC.106
On February 8th, the Spanish Professor Alvaro Gil Robles was appointed
by the European Court of Human Rights.107 Mr. Gil Robles is the former
Ombudsman in Spain and worked as a commissioner on the Commission created
to investigate and clarify the Police Repression in the Basque Country during
Franco’s dictatorship.108 The next day, the International Centre for Transitional
Justice appointed the Spanish Professor Juan E. Méndez.109 Professor Méndez
was chairman of the Centre between 2004 and 2009. He also was the UN Special
Rapporteur for Torture and Cruel Punishment and a Special Advisor to the UN
Secretary General for the prevention of Genocide.110
Finally, on February 16, the board of the System of Public Universities
appointed Professor Claudia Vaca as their representative.111 Professor Vaca, a
chemical pharmacologist who has tenure in the National University and before
joining the SC, had experienced working in the Public Health sector as special
advisor for the Colombian Ministry of Health, was the only woman in the SC
and the only commissioner without a legal background.112 Unanimously, the
other Commissioners appointed her as the chairwomen of the SC.113 In a
ceremony on April 5, 2017, that included the participation of President Juan
Manuel Santos, the Committee was formally installed.114 But as the next sections
will explain, the work and challenges that awaited the SC were considerable.
II. THE SELECTION PROCESS
The same month the Committee was formed it immediately had to address
several problems. The first problem was related to funding.115 The SC was not
created by any bill or disposition enacted by the Congress. This meant that there
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was not any allocation from the public budget for the Committee’s work.116
Hence, the first task of the SC was to submit an application to the Post-Conflict
Multi-Partner Trust Fund for Colombia (PCTF), an international donor fund run
by the United Nations and created with the sole purpose of funding projects
related to post-conflict stabilization, confidence building measures and
preparation for and implementation of the Peace Agreements.117 According to
Commissioner Hemingway the negotiations with the PCTF were not easy. In
particular, there were a lot of discussions regarding the development of the
digital platform that was going to host the information of all the candidates to
the SJP.118
On one hand, for budgetary concerns, the PCTF wanted to use an already
existing government-run online platform for the SJP selection process.119 Their
idea was to build the application from a government-hosted webpage.120 On the
other hand, after reviewing some of those webpages, the SC concluded that the
best alternative, for purposes of independence and transparency, was to build a
completely new online platform fully administered by the Committee.121 For
Commissioner Hemingway, this decision was critical to guarantee the autonomy
of the SC’s work. If the platform was hosted on the webpage of a public entity
its officials could possibly access information without the consent or the
supervision of the SC.122 This proposal was received with considerable
resistance. In fact, Commissioner Hemingway described it as the “most difficult
part of the negotiation process with the PCTF.”123 The administers of the fund
initially thought that it was impossible to create a brand-new platform in such
short notice while the Commissioners were convinced that today’s technological
advancement make it possible to have an online platform that could host
thousands of applicants’ information while guaranteeing the security and
integrity of the data.124
Finally, after all the commissioners were adamantly clear that they were not
going to continue their work without a totally independent and digitalized
database, the Fund accepted the SC proposal.125 The PCTF, after a public request
for proposals, approved the project and the SC spent the following weeks
working with the selected provider on the specifications of the platform.126
Commissioner Hemingway explained that this process included not only
discussions about the security safeguards for the information but also the best
possible ways to quantify the gender, regional and ethnic variables included in
the Peace Agreement and the Constitutional Amendment that created the SJP.127
In the words of Commissioner Hemingway, “the platform had to be designed in
a manner that allowed each commissioner to analyze and cross examine all of
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the candidates’ CVs against the differential variables contemplated in the
Accords and other important characteristics, such as their level of legal
education”.128
The next challenge following the negotiations over the digital platform was
logistical. The five commissioners were appointed on a part-time basis, so they
did not have the possibility of being full-time members of the SC.129 Also, three
of them lived outside Colombia so there was a clear impossibility of working
together during long periods of time, at least in person.130 As part of the funds
allocated by the PCTF to the SC, each Commissioner was able to appoint an
administrative clerk to help them with the day to day work of the process.131
Also, the SC received enough funding to hire a technical staff of around 10
persons whose main responsibility was to process the considerable amount of
information received during the application process.132
With these obstacles overcome, the SC formally initiated the appointment
process. On July 4, 2017, the Committee simultaneously published on its website
and through the country’s major news outlets the general terms of the application
process.133 The call for applications included a detailed schedule and the
instructions for how to complete the online form on the Committee’s
webpage.134 Neither the Peace Accord nor the Constitutional Amendment that
created the SJP provided any rules of procedure or timetable for the selection of
the judges. In this the SC was completely autonomous.135 The Committee
decided that the whole process would take three months and that it would be
divided in several parts.136
The first part, between July 24 and August 2, was the general call for
applications.137 During this period candidates filled the online form available at
the Committee’s webpage and uploaded the proper documents certifying their
professional and academic background.138 From the deadline to August 11th, the
SC administrative staff reviewed all the submitted applications and determined
if they were properly completed.139 This process was just a formal review
conducted by the clerks of the SC. At this point, the Commissioners did not have
any access to the information.140 On August 12th, the SC proceeded to publish
the CVs of all the candidates who had the required experience to be a judge of
the SJP according to the terms set by the Constitution.141 Then, from August 12
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to August 22, the online platform was enabled so that any person, foreign or
Colombian, could comment on the suitability of the candidates.142 From the end
of that period to September 17, the SC reviewed all the comments and then called
a short-list of candidates to personal interviews with the five Commissioners.143
The interviews were conducted from September 18 to September 22.144 Finally,
the SC announced the names of the 51-selected judges on September 26.145
Besides the timetable, the terms of the application published by the SC
reasserted that the final composition of the SJP was going to reflect a balance of
genders, regional backgrounds, ethnicities and expertise in Human Rights and
International Humanitarian Law.146 However, the document also stated that the
selection process would take into account “international standards of judicial
independence as well as the highest ethical qualities of the candidates.”147
When asked about these particular criteria, Commissioner Hemingway
explained that the intention of the SC was to be absolutely clear about the
standards of selection and that the Peace Accord provided the baseline from
which the appointments were to be made.148 Nevertheless, he did not define what
the SC meant by “international standards of judicial independence” or “high
ethical qualities.”149 In his opinion, “the SC was very careful of not using any
kind of informal or previously uninformed criteria to make the final
selection.”150 However, Commissioner Hemingway explained that internally the
Committee had made a decision regarding the type of Court to be appointed.151
He recounted “the SC since the beginning wanted to have a balanced
representation between people who have strong expertise in the judiciary,
academia and policy. For us, beyond the formal criteria established by the Peace
Accord, it was desirable to create an SJP that combined, in a balanced and
proportionate way, these three backgrounds. We also wanted to give voice to
those who were never heard. In fact, we deliberately wanted to appoint persons
that in the ordinary process of appointing judges in Colombia were always
barred or excluded due to their lack of political leverage.”152
Based on the interviews conducted, the participants in the process seemed
to have mixed feelings regarding these last criteria. Candidate Twain153, an
attorney who was not appointed by the SC, explained that she had difficulties
describing her experience to the Committee because her professional
background overlaps between Academia and work at various Human Rights
NGO’s.154 She mentioned “the digital platform was indeed a guarantee of
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transparency. However, it was designed in a very rigid way. For example, I could
not add my part-time academic experience as a lecturer in law with my full-time
job as a Human Rights advocate because the system only allowed me to put
multiple jobs in the same period of time if the percentage of occupancy equaled
100%. What weight should I have given to my job as a lecturer, that I knew was
an important factor for the SC? 10% or 15%? This was very unclear to me during
the process.”155
This problem, that appeared to be a logistical challenge, had strong
repercussions in the selection process because of the measures taken by the SC
after the submission period ended.156 After the general call for applications,
between July 24 and August 2, the technical staff were in charge of reviewing
each online form.157 In particular, they were responsible for assessing the
authenticity and validity of documents the candidates attached to their
applications to certify their working experience.158 During the call for
applications, the SC received almost 3,600 applications, so their task was not
easy.159 Someone who arbitrarily picked 10% to represent their part-time
lecturing job was given less weight for their academic background than someone
with the same job who arbitrarily picked 20%.
With the great number of applications, the technical staff did not have a lot
of time to cross-reference the information included by each candidate. Thus,
they did not recognize that, in cases like the one described above, the academic
experience could be the same between two candidates and the Commissioners
would not be aware of the discrepancy.
After the formal vetting process ended, the SC published the CVs of 2076
qualified candidates on August 11.160 By “qualified”, Commissioner
Hemingway explained that only those applications that were incomplete or
candidates whose working experience could not be properly verified were
discarded in the first stage.161 He also explained that, because of the high volume
of CVs, the five Commissioners were not able to review all the raw data
uploaded by the candidates.162 To have a comprehensive analysis of all the
applications, they asked their staff to prepare a report based on the established
criteria of professional background.163 Hence, the Commissioners assigned a
numerical value to each criterion based on years of experience and their clerks
tallied each application score and thus preliminarily ranked the candidates.164
Next, this information was cross-referenced with the gender, geographic, and
ethnic criteria established by the Peace Accord to create a preliminary idea of
which candidates should be called for an interview in the second stage of the
selection process.165
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The platform was conceived in a way that hoped for a smooth interaction
with the SC but some candidates that participated in the process thought that the
online application form had a cumbersome design that hindered access to the
selection procedure. For example, Justice Dickens, a candidate selected for the
SJP, explained that the online application was more transparent than the
traditional system of appointing judges in Colombia.166 However, he also stated
that the application was comprehensive and that it took him a considerable
amount of time to fill the entire form. He also mentioned that he needed
assistance from a younger relative, more savvy in technological advancement,
to upload all the required information.167 Although he acknowledged that this
could be a problem related to a generational gap in the use of new technologies,
he also professed that he knew many candidates who failed to complete their
application because of this.168
This critique is partially shared by younger applicants such as Justice Poe,
also an appointed member of the SJP. Although he defines himself as a person
that has daily interactions with technology, he shared Justice Dickens’
criticism.169 In his words, “the paperwork the candidates had to scan and upload
was monumental.”170 In particular, he expressed that many candidates he
knew—including himself—had a considerable amount of problems with the
design of the webpage regarding the information they had to submit relative to
their working experience.171 The platform asked that the candidates detail the
exact number of hours dedicated to each task submitted in the application and
demanded certification of those hours from each employer. This process
presented complications regarding part-time jobs—such as being lecturer in a
university—because for many candidates it was difficult to obtain job
certifications with that particular information.172
However, Justice Poe also explained that he took proper measures to avoid
any last-minute problems with the application. For example, he noted that the
system allowed candidates to save their progress, so it was plausible to dedicate
a few hours every day to the task without facing any major backlog of work.173
He also explained that many of the problems he heard from other candidates
were not related to the application form but to a generational unfamiliarity with
the use of technology.174 For example, he explained that one common problem
was related to the required conversion of job certifications and diplomas into
PDF files. While this is a common task for any younger user of technology, it
seemed to be a herculean task for more traditionally trained candidates.175 For
Commissioner Hemingway, he thought this was more a problem of time-
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management and lack of candidate motivation than anything else.176 In fact, he
highlighted that the platform never went offline, especially on the application
deadline, when there was a considerable hike in the use of the online tools by
the candidates.177
The other critique the interviewees had for this stage was more structural
and related to a significant problem associated with Internet access in Colombia;
there was no possibility of sending hard copies of the application to the SC178179.
For Commissioner Hemingway this decision was necessary to maintain the
efficiency of the process.180 Once an application was submitted online a
computer program would extract the relevant data and put it in a spreadsheet for
further analysis.181 If the Committee had allowed for candidates to present their
applications on paper it would have created a disparity among the applicants.
For one, the review process would have taken longer for those attorneys who
filed the application on paper. Also, there would be strong obstacles for cross
referencing the information with the differential criteria explained above,
because the possibilities of omitting proper information while manually
extracting the data to the spreadsheet were high. In this sense, Commissioner
Hemingway explained that the success of the process was highly dependent on
the proper systemization and digitalization of the information—achievable only
through the online process designed by the SC.182
However, this online-only design had to confront a particular obstacle.
According to the Colombian Ministry of Information and Technology, as of
2017, only 33% of the households in Colombia have access to a high quality 4G
Internet connection.183 This average is lower if you examine isolated regions—
such as the one where the Massacre of Bojayá occurred—where the coverage of
Internet only amounts to 3.7% of the population.184 This imposed a burden on
those candidates who live in rural regions where Internet access is relatively
unavailable. Justice Faulkner, who was elected as one of the representatives of
the minority ethnic communities in the SJP, confirmed this problem.185 He
explained that the online platform was really complicated for African Colombian
and indigenous candidates.186 Justice Faulkner described the platform as
problematic because he did not have the technical knowledge to, on his own,
digitalize and upload all the documents the SC required to certify his academic
and professional background.187 However, he was able to submit an application

176

Interview with Commissioner Hemingway, supra note 94.
Id.
178
Interview with Candidate Twain, supra note 153.
179
Interview with Justice Dickens, supra note 166.
180
Interview with Commissioner Hemingway, supra note 94.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
MINISTERIO DE TECNOLOGIAS DE LA INFORMACION Y LAS COMUNICACIONES, BOLETIN
TRIMESTRAL DE LAS TIC: CIFRAS TERCER TRIMESTRE DE 2017 19–22 (2018).
184
Id.
185
Skype Interview with Justice Faulkner, Judge of the SJP (Jan. 13, 2018) [hereinafter Interview
with Justice Faulkner].
186
Id.
187
Id.
177

228

NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.

vol. 10:2

with the help of friends who had more technical knowledge and access to a
reliable Internet connection.188
Justice Faulkner recognized that he personally new many attorneys from
minority communities who lived in rural areas that, despite expressing a strong
interest in being part of the SJP, did not submit an application because of these
complexities.189 In his words:
Any candidate who wanted to fill the forms and submit the
documents in time had to dedicate, at least, 8 days to the
process. Most likely, the problem with minorities was worsened
by the fact that many candidates waited until the last day to
finish the application. Nevertheless, the SC didn’t provide any
type of technical help. In my case, I tried to contact the
Committee by phone and e-mail several times without any
success.190
Conversely, for those candidates who had experience interacting with the
traditional judicial nomination system in Colombia, the SJP selection process
was a welcome novelty—thanks in particular to the participation of foreign
experts in the Commission. Justice Woolf, who had a successful career in the
Judicial System, complimented the SC’s digital system.191 In her opinion:
The SC methods were unprecedented, and they adjusted
perfectly to the complexity that comes with the creation of
Transitional Justice Special Courts. In particular, the
participation of three foreign experts in the decision-making
process guaranteed impartiality. This also was reflected in the
design of the platform, as the application allowed a wide
democratic participation—anyone could apply if he or she
could certify the required experience—and a strong scrutiny
from the public.192
In fact, she concluded that the participation of foreigners should be
expanded to the ordinary system for judicial selection in the country.193 In her
opinion, foreigners had more incentives to act in an independent manner because
they were isolated from the Colombian political environment.194 However, this
is an opinion that is not shared by all the judges on the SJP. When asked about
the possibility of creating a similar commission for the appointment of all the
judges in Colombia, Justice Dickens vehemently rejected the idea, saying that
“Colombians are capable of selecting their own judges and the success of the SC
in this case is explained, in part, by the extraordinary circumstances that
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surrounded this process. In ordinary times this type of model could be seen as
an improper interference over our own sovereignty.”195
Justice Melville, who in the past unsuccessfully participated in a public
process to be appointed to one of the country’s highest courts, also had a
favorable impression of the SJP selection method.196 He resented his past
experience with the ordinary judicial system. In his opinion:
The process for selecting judges in the traditional courts in
Colombia is humiliating. People have to constantly lobby with
those responsible for the selection in a patronage system that
only awards those with political influence. By contrast, this new
process was transparent. Putting aside the fact that I was
selected, I am really happy with the result because I am
completely independent. I don’t owe my appointment to anyone
but to myself and my merits.197
Justice Wilde, who was on the President’s shortlist to be appointed by the
Colombian Senate for the Constitutional Court, shares this feeling.198 She
believes that there are a lot of lessons from this process that should be applied
in the country’s judicial service.199 In her opinion, there was a general sentiment
among the applicants that the members of the SC shielded themselves from any
outer interference.200 There was a clear distance between the Commissioners and
the candidates not only because of the fact that three of them did not live in
Colombia but also because all of them, including the ones that live in the
country, acted accordingly.201 In particular, to identify some of the good
practices to be implemented, she highlighted the creation of the online platform
and the publicity of the selection criteria as measures that should be incorporated
with great urgency in the judiciary.202 Also, she emphasized the importance of
the behavior of the Commissioners during the process. For her, the members of
the SC kept a clear and impassable distance with all the candidates.203 In her
particular case, she explained that she only met the Commissioners once when
she was called to the public hearing where the interviews with the short-listed
applicants were conducted.204
The second phase of the process began on August 12 and concluded on
August 22, during which any citizen or organization could, through the SC’s
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online platform, send comments regarding any of the 2076 preliminary
candidates.205 According to the rules of the process articulated by the members
of the SC, there were two mandatory rules during this phase. First, every
commentator—without exception—had to identify himself with his full name
and ID.206 Second, only the members of the SC and their staff were authorized
to access the information included in the comments.207
For Commissioner Hemingway these rules had two purposes. First,
prohibiting anonymity was a measure designed to guarantee seriousness and
rigorousness in the comments posted about any candidate.208 For the SC, it was
clear that in the extremely polarized context that surrounded the Colombian
Peace Process—after all, the Agreement was initially rejected by a very thin
margin in a Plebiscite conducted on October 2, 2016—it was necessary to
require people to assume responsibility for their own comments. In this sense,
anonymity was seen by the SC as a “gate by which the political debate would
permeate the selection process.”209
Second, the SC took strong measures to guarantee the safety of the
information sent by citizens.210 They invested heavily—using the Foreign Aid
funds granted by the United Nations—in the protection of the digital platform
where the comments were deposited.211 Only through a personal and traceable
password were the administrative staff of the SC able to access the information
and there were clear rules that prohibited any kind of data sharing with the
candidates.212 For Commissioner Hemingway, this was part of the SC’s
success.213 The careful handling of the information allowed the commissioners
to examine each CV in detail, and the security of the online platform provided
confidence to those citizens and organizations that were interested in the process.
As an example of this, Commissioner Hemingway revealed that the system was
attacked by hackers who were in pursuit of the information contained in the
comments sent by the public.214 However, the security countermeasures
designed and installed were effective—guaranteeing the security of the data.215
According to the final report published by the SC, 16,945 comments were
received.216 The Selection Committee then proceeded to analyze the
information. Commissioner Hemingway seems to have contradictory feelings
about the results. On one hand, he thinks that the high number of opinions
strengthened the selection process, as it demonstrated strong civic
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participation.217 On the other hand, he lamented that many candidates thought
that this part of the process was a popularity contest and that—through social
networks and even direct appeal campaigns—several candidates asked people to
support the application as a way to influence the decision of the SC.218 For the
Commissioner, this interpretation completely misunderstood the logic of the
process and only created a backlog of work for the administrative staff of the
SC.219 He believed that the role of the public debate around the CVs of the
applicants should have focused on serious ethical or professional claims against
these candidates rather than which one of them was more popular.220
Candidate Twain admitted that he asked for support for his candidacy
through his social networks.221 He recalls that he contacted several Human
Rights organizations and friends to send comments to the online platform
underpinning his professional experience and capacity in the field of
Transitional Justice.222 It is unclear whether this sort of conduct had a negative
impact on the final decision of the SC or if the Commissioners red flagged this
type of activity. What it is clear, is that the SC heavily considered the comments
that seriously questioned the ethical conduct of the candidate. An example of
this is the case of Mr. Francisco Ricaurte. Mr. Ricaurte, a highly controversial
former justice of the Colombian Supreme Court, applied for a place on the SJP.
During his tenure as a judge, Mr. Ricaurte was accused in the media of nepotism
and corruption.223 Although at the moment of the selection he did not have any
criminal or disciplinary record, his presence in the process was strongly
criticized and many organizations and citizens were publically against his
nomination.224 Because of the processes’ anonymity, it was not possible to
determine how many comments the SC received regarding Mr. Ricaurte’s
character. What is clear is that this candidate did not make the short-list for the
personal interviews. In the end, it turns out that the SC was right to take proper
precautions in this case. In September 2017, he was preventively sent to prison
by a judge—similar to being held without bail during trial in the United States—
for allegedly receiving bribes as a justice in exchange for deciding cases in
certain ways.225
According to the timetable designed by the SC, the next step involved a
personal interview with a short list of 78 candidates.226 According to
Commissioner Hemingway, the selection of this short list was the result of a
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careful evaluation of the data obtained from every application.227 Because all the
information was uploaded online to the digital platform, transferring the data of
every candidate to a quantitative tool—such as Excel—was relatively easy.228 In
this way, the SC was able to classify the candidates based on each of the formal
category of selection (gender, ethnic origin and region) and their professional
experience.229 Commissioner Hemingway explained that:
[c]andidates were separated in individual spreadsheets by their
type of experience. Further, they were then ranked using formal
categories. For example, we grouped candidates by type of
experience (judicial system, public sector, academia) and then
ranked them based on their gender, ethnicity or regional origin.
Those candidates who certify different type of experience were
included in all the spreadsheets and were then compared with
the other members of their subgroup.230
Commissioner Hemingway explained that this system greatly facilitated
selecting the candidates that were going to be called for interviews.231 This is so,
because it was easy to identify candidates that were in the upper tier of every
spreadsheet. Also, this information was shared with every member of the SC and
they, based on the data, elaborated their own short list.232 However, it is not clear
how the public comments were factored into the final tabulation and the
similarity between the actual short-list that was published on September 18,
2017, and the rank set up in the spreadsheet. In fact, this was a contentious issue
according to the interviews. For example, Candidate Twain thought the criteria
for elaborating the short-list was not clear.233 To him “the experience of the
candidates in domestic law was overshadowed in the analysis made by the
Commissioners. Although I have had considerable experience in many national
debates about the protection of victims, it seems to me that the SC preferred
candidates who had more international know-how. For example, they preferred
candidates who had experience in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
above those of us who had more qualifications in national law.”234 He also
mentioned that in the terms of the application, there was no mention of the
number of candidates that were going to be short-listed. In his opinion, this
promoted wider discretion among the members of the SC and contrasted with
their desire of transparency and consistency.235
In contrast, for Commissioner Hemingway the possible biases each member
could have had at the moment of elaborating their own list were reduced by one
specific circumstance.236 The first one is related to a benchmark set by the SC
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regarding the votes necessary to for a candidate to be placed on the short-list.
They agreed that each candidate should have, at least, four out of five votes to
be included in the next part of the process.237 This promoted a consensus basedapproach inside the SC that guaranteed the reduced impact of any individual
interest or agenda.238
Commissioner Hemingway illustrates this with an example. After the results
were tabulated, each Commissioner received the information and worked
individually for two weeks on the analysis of the data. After that, they personally
met in a full-day private session where they discussed their findings. He
explained that the Commissioners were able to identify three groups among the
candidates: an upper tier group of candidates that clearly exceled over the rest,
a lower tier group that were in the bottom positions among the 2000 candidates
and a middle group that—without being part of the upper tier group—had strong
credentials and expertise and could be considered for the positions.239 In the case
of the first group, the Commissioner explained that there were strong
coincidences among the short-list each member of the SC created.240 Also,
without exception, none of the Commissioners included in their final draft an
applicant that was part of the lower tier candidate pool.241 Regarding the third
group, the majority rule of the SC served as a safeguard against any particular
bias. Commissioner Hemingway explained that there were few discrepancies
among the members in this stage of the process and that “when you have five
sets of eyes reviewing the information it is very easy to reach to decisions
regarding the short-list.”242 Regarding the number of short-listed candidates, the
Commissioner explained that the initial goal “was to have at least two candidates
per position. Taking into account that there were 51 spots available we had
reason to call for interviews, at most, 102 candidates. This was because we were
basically constrained by time.”243
It is important to highlight that the answer given by Commissioner
Hemingway about the number of short-listed candidates does not explain the
decision to only call 78 applicants to the interview process. Time was indeed a
factor that constrained the capacity of action of the SC, especially taking into
account that the majority of the SC’s members did not live in Colombia. This
suggests that the decisions regarding the names of the interviewees was highly
discretionary. It is also true that the names were picked after the list of candidates
was divided using the formal criteria included in the Peace Accord and the
Constitution. However, the data collected, as showed in the next chapter, does
not explain, nor deny, that the selections were made only using the names of
candidates that were in the upper tier of the list. Indeed, this choice remains an
open question.
For his part, Justice Faulkner recognized the transparency of the process.
However, he did not agree with the SC’s decision not to disclose the public
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comments they received.244 In his opinion, the rules set by the Commissioners
regarding access to this information and the publicity of their methods were
inexplicably omitted in this part of the process.245 However, he thought the more
contentious issue was related to the organization of the interview process. In his
case, he explained that he was notified by a clerk of the SC that he was included
on the short list on a Sunday night and at that moment he was informed that the
interview was going to be conducted in Bogotá, the capital of Colombia, that
Wednesday.246 Justice Faulkner, as one of the candidates that represented an
ethnic minority in the process, lived outside the city and organizing the trip on
such short notice was a financial burden.247 When asked about the decision of
the SC to hold the interviews in Bogotá, Commissioner Hemingway explained
that this was done because three of the commissioners were foreigners and they
could only remain in the country during a short period of time due to their
professional commitments.248
Other candidates seemed to have a less contentious experience with this
process. For example, Justice Wilde described the interview as fair and
balanced.249 In particular, she said that she “was surprised that the questions
asked by the Commissioners, without exception, were difficult and profound. I
felt like I was in a very serious exam and I was pleased that the format of the
interviews was flexible, so I was able to establish a rich dialogue with each
member of the SC.”250 In fact, the only criticism she had was that the interviews
were not transmitted live but recorded and then posted on the webpage of the
SC. For her, it was more desirable to broadcast all the interviews to improve
transparency.251 Justice Woolf had a similar criticism. Taking into account her
experience regarding the traditional system for appointing judges in Colombia,
she considered that the interviews were one of the true contributions of the SJP
selection process. For her, “this type of interviews should be replicated and
expanded throughout the judicial system.”252
During this process, the political opposition to the Peace Agreement stated
that the Commission acted in a biased, unfair and unbalanced manner. This
objection was explained by Mrs. Hamlet, a right-wing political leader who was
part of the team that renegotiated the terms of the Peace Agreement with the
government after the results of the Plebiscite that rejected the original deal. She
described the SJP as a “conglomeration of left-wing parties and human rights
organizations”253 that constantly and publicly accused the main leader of the
opposition, former President Alvaro Uribe Velez, of committing war crimes
during his presidency.254
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To support her claim, Mrs. Hamlet stated that the majority of the members
of the newly created SJP came from academia or the human rights activist
community,255 sectors that have traditionally been accused of sympathizing with
the Guerrillas.256 Furthermore, this argument has been incorporated into the
official narrative of the Colombian Armed Forces257, who argue that the new
SJP will disfavor state agents and right-wing politicians and will disregard the
crimes committed by the guerrillas. Under this premise, the opposition has tried
to undermine the social legitimacy of the Tribunal, denouncing the process as
rigged since its conception, and arguing that the SJP lacks the validity to
determine criminal responsibility for acts committed during a conflict.258 Mrs.
Horatio, a conservative academic who was part of the team of advisors of the
opposition during the renegotiation process of the Accords, goes further in her
critic to the SC. In her opinion, “the Selection Committee totally lacks
legitimacy because Colombians rejected the Peace Agreement by popular
vote.”259
For the opposition, participating in the selection process was not an option
because it would have been seen as an endorsement of the peace process as a
whole. For example, Mrs. Horatio, who is part of the faculty of a conservative
law school in the country, explained that she knew that other schools reached
out to their alumni, inviting them to participate in the process.260 However, her
law school abstained because “we did not perceive any guarantee of
independence in the process because the profiles of the commissioners were
clearly closer to those who supported the Peace Agreement.”261 As an example
of this, Mrs. Hamlet added that the opposition was never informed that the SC
planned to receive and review information from the public regarding the
applicants and that is why they did not participate in the process of reviewing
the CVs of the candidates.262
Even the presence of judges with a military background did not seem to
guarantee independence for the opposition. Mrs. Hamlet dismissed that
argument because the presence of judges with a military background in the SJP
is minimal.263 She highlighted the fact that of the 38 permanent judges of the
Tribunal only two came from the military showing that their impact would be,
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even in the best-case scenario, residual.264 Also, when confronted with the fact
that many soldiers and officials already presented a formal petition to the SJP to
receive the benefits included in the Peace Agreement265, Mrs. Horatio contested
that this situation is explained by the fact that the military wanted to receive the
same benign treatment conceded by the government to FARC members. She
continued by claiming that this was an unfair situation because members of the
military should be judged by a completely different standard; one that recognizes
its efforts and sacrifices confronting the guerillas for many years.266
For both interviewees, the problems related to the SJP were associated with
its conception as a totally new Tribunal that would work in tandem with the
ordinary courts. They claimed this creates a considerable risk of overlap that, in
the long-run, would create obstacles for properly reviewing and judging the
crimes committed by the guerilla—a situation that would inevitably bring
impunity.267 As a solution, Mrs. Horatio opined that the best model for
implementing the Peace Agreement was already established—the existing Peace
and Justice System268 created during former President Alvaro Uribe’s tenure.
This system was implemented after a peace negotiation held between Mr.
Uribe’s government and the United Self-Defense Force of Colombia (AUC) a
confederation of paramilitaries that were created in the 80’s by Colombia’s rural
elites to combat the expansion of the FARC.269 Under this system, special
chambers were created inside the ordinary criminal system to prosecute the
crimes committed by members of the AUC, under the condition that they
confessed their crimes and supported the reparation of their victims.270
Mrs. Hamlet supported this idea, expressing that these chambers, created in
2005 and still working in some parts of the country, already had the knowledge,
manpower and experience to handle the difficult task that comes with
Transitional Justice.271 Also, from her viewpoint, all the members of the Armed
Forces that are going to be investigated as perpetrators of crimes during the
conflict should be tried by the military justice system and not the SJP.272 For her,
this is the appropriate forum because she thinks that only those who have served
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and been in combat could understand the difficulties and dilemmas that a
combatant has to confront during war.273
Regarding the members of the SC, both Mrs. Hamlet and Mrs. Horatio
noted that they did not have any doubt regarding their ethical or professional
standing. However, they questioned their independence. To Mrs. Hamlet, the
members of the Committee, especially the foreigners, develop their careers as
human rights activists before joining the SC. She thinks this background clearly
compromises their judgment and makes them bias lawyers that share their
ideologies.274 Mrs. Horatio had a very similar opinion, but she added that the
problem was that the parties assumed because the commission had foreign
members, that it was independent. For her, this was a “very typical Colombian
perspective that has no support from hard evidence.”275 She concluded then, that
in reality there was no control over the actions of the SC, so it was impossible
to verify its independence.276
When asked about her opinion on the matter, Justice Woolf responded that
it is normal and desirable that the members of a Transitional Justice Court have
strong experience in Human Rights.277 In his words, “you could not think that it
is plausible or appropriate to appoint experts in tax law to judge the perpetrators
of the worst crimes committed during a civil conflict.”278 Justice Wilde shares
this feeling as she explained that, unfortunately, one of the many unintended
consequences of the Colombian conflict has been the demonization of human
rights activism because it has been unjustifiably related to a left-wing agenda
sympathetic with the guerrillas.279 Advocacy has, in this sense, also been a
victim of Colombia’s war.
With regard to the SC, their members have publicly defended the process,
stating that they acted according to the explicit terms of the Peace Agreement
and the formal selection criteria outlined therein and explained above.280 When
confronted with these critiques, Commissioner Hemingway reiterated that the
SC developed, with the assistance of the UNDP, an algorithm in order to
quantify the characteristics of each candidate and establish a numerical result
that reflected their overall qualification according to the criteria outlined in the
Peace Agreement and the Constitution.281 The idea behind this mechanism was
to reduce, to the furthest extent possible, the personal biases of each
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Commissioner. For Commissioner Hemingway, this algorithm allowed the SC
to make informed decisions, taking into account that they had to review all the
applications without any prejudice.282 Also, he explained that the SC directly
approached the Armed Forces, and in meetings with the Office of the Army’s
Chief of Staff and with other high-ranking officers they directly invited them to
participate in the process.283 He explained that, under the SC perception, the
military members were eager to contribute to the process. Further, he believed
that they were pivotal for its success because they could contribute their combat
experience and apply International Humanitarian Law to analyze the cases that
the SJP must review.284
Regarding the final decision of the 51 judges of the SJP, Commissioner
Hemingway explained that the interviews were fundamental, but they
supplemented the results of the data analysis collected during the process.285 He
explained that “although each Commissioner could have his own ideal candidate
for the SJP before this stage, the truth of the matter was that after the interviews,
the selection was relatively easy because we, in general, saw that those
candidates who stood out in their application also stood out in the interview.”286
Surprisingly, with the exception of Mrs. Horatio and Mrs. Hamlet287, the other
interviewees did not express any concern or doubt about the final selection.
However, it is important to recognize that the sample of interviewees only
included one candidate who was not selected—who also did not express any
particular objection to the final selection—so the results of the qualitative
analysis in this part of the process relies heavily on those applicants who were
finally selected and that, probably, did not hold any doubt or resentment towards
the SC for its decision.
The interviews among the stakeholders that participated in the selection
process allow us to draw some preliminary conclusions regarding the selection
process. First, the use of big data was relevant for the Commissioners. The online
platform that received all the applications was conceived to trace and process all
the information in a way that allowed each Commissioner to separate each
applicant based on their gender, regional and ethnic criteria. However, the
process was not perfect. In particular, it seems that the SC did not anticipate the
obstacles to uploading information on the platform combined with the limited
access to Internet in marginal regions of Colombia. In other respects, the process
for short-listing the candidates seems murky to some of the stakeholders
involved in the process while for others the criteria applied by the
Commissioners were clear and consistent. In general, the participants in the
process had a very positive view of the process with respect to its transparency
and independence. Nevertheless, the opposition to the Peace Agreement, held
that the process was broken since its conception. For these sectors, the
participation of foreigners with a particular agenda of Human Rights jeopardized
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the selection of the SJP. Also, the final composition of the Tribunal confirmed
the biases of the process.
Through the qualitative study just presented, a general impression of the
selection process could be formed. The next section includes a quantitative
analysis which uses the raw data gathered by the SC to determine if there were
any inconsistencies or biases in the judicial selection process.
III. THE DATA
Statistics can be inconsistent.288 Although statistics are everywhere, they
often suffer from—particularly in the Colombian judiciary—a reputation of
being uninteresting and inaccessible. However, one of the novelties in the
process designed by the SC is that the data of each of the candidates was publicly
available through the Committee webpage. In fact, one of Commissioner
Hemingway’s assistants provided the raw data of the 2076 candidates that
applied for a position in the SJP. Hence, it was possible to create a code-book
with 69 variables289 that allowed for the running of a series of correlations, based
on the gender, ethnographic or regional origin of the candidates. This was done
to detect how the Commissioners applied the selection criteria in reality. All this
was conducted, under the hypothesis that the representation from each of these
demographic sectors would be higher among those chosen for the Tribunal than
compared with the entire candidate pool.
For example, hypothetically, if the majority of the 2076 candidates were
men from large cities, but they were underrepresented in the final selection, it is
possible that the Committee effectively applied a selection bias in favor of
women, as the Peace Accord instructed. The same could be determined, for
example, for attorneys with military backgrounds or those who, because of their
human rights experience, were labeled by the political opposition as not
independent. Hence, in the following pages, a descriptive, quantitative
correlation among the three set groups (i.e., gender, ethnicity, and regional
origin) is presented.
The first area of analysis is related to the gender of the candidates. Figures
1.1 and 1.2 show a simple correlation based on the gender distribution of the
2076 candidates compared with the final distribution in the 51 appointed judges.

288

CHARLES J. WHEELAN, NAKED STATISTICS: STRIPPING THE DREAD FROM THE DATA 9–13 (2013).
Harvey Suárez, the Administrative Secretary of the Selection Committee, generously provide the
Author with the raw data of all the information related to the applications submitted to the SC. With that
data, and with the help of the programming language R, the Author built a multivariable model on an
Excel Spreadsheet. All the results presented in this chapter are the result of the different variables the
Author contrasted using the self-made model. Appendix A presents the list and characteristic of each of
the analyze variables.
289

240

NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.

vol. 10:2

FIGURE 1.1: GENDER DISTRIBUTION (TOTAL)
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Preliminarily, the results in these figures suggest that the Committee had a
strong preference for women. While women only composed 38% of the universe
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of candidates, they made up a majority of the Tribunal (55%).290 A simple
correlation between the percentage would say that the representation of women
grew in a rate approximately 1.5. Now, when the correlation regarding women
includes a variable for professional background, based on the last job candidates
had before applying to the SJP, some interesting results are found.
FIGURE 2.1: WOMEN’S PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND (TOTAL)
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FIGURE 2.2: WOMEN’S PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND (APPOINTED)
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When cross-referencing the variable of gender with other variables,
interesting findings appear. For example, these charts show that, while the
majority of the women candidates had a background in the judiciary, the SC had
a strong tendency to choose female applicants with experience in Academia and
in the Private Sector (law firms). This shows that the SC totally disregarded
candidates with policymaking backgrounds (as defined as experience in the
Public Sector holding administrative or executive authority).291
When the information is cross-referenced with men, the result is similar.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 demonstrate that, in the case of male judges, the SC gave
more weight to executive expertise as compared to women. Also, proportionally,
the judicial experience did not play a very important factor in the selection as
compared to expertise in the private sector and in academia. However, it is
important to clarify that the correlation does not measure how multiple
experiences in different sectors was measured by the SC. These charts help
illustrate a tendency that could be considered an informal criterion applied by
the Commissioners—understood as a preference for lawyers that have recent
academic and practical experience—but it is not clear how much weight, if any,
each background was given in the specific cases of candidates that worked in
different sectors.292
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FIGURE 3.1: MEN’S PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND (TOTAL)
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FIGURE 3.2: MEN’S PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND (APPOINTED)
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Comparing the data set using the independent variables of age and gender
reveals that the SC tended to choose younger women and older men. The SC
decided to give an opportunity to younger female lawyers between the ages of
40 and 49, but chose older men, between the ages of 50 and 59. This could show
that the SC took into account that the professional development of women is
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particularly harder, thanks to systematic discrimination and harsher work
environments (related to maternity for example).
FIGURE 4.1: DISTRIBUTION OF CANDIDATES BY AGE (TOTAL)
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FIGURE 4.2: DISTRIBUTION OF CANDIDATES BY AGE (APPOINTED)
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However, the results could also have a negative interpretation. The charts
suggest that, proportionally, the distribution of age maintained a certain
equilibrium. However, for both men and women, there is a particular drop for
lawyers that are above 60 years old. These results could eventually show that
ageism was an issue in the selection process. Younger candidates, especially
between the ages of 40 and 58, were preferred over more experienced lawyers.293
However, this could also be explained by the fact the SJP, based on the Peace
Accord and the Constitutional Amendment that created it, has a 20-year
mandate. That could be why the SC looked for a certain balance of ages that
could improve the likelihood that the appointed judges would fulfill their whole
tenure.
The previous analysis seems to be confirmed when the data set is cross
referenced using the independent variable of years of work experience. While
the majority of women appointed to the court are part of the first quartile of
experience (10 to 15 years of experience), men are evenly distributed along all
the quartiles.294 These results also suggest informal criteria were applied by the
Commissioners. For the first chambers of the SJP, which required at least ten
years of experience, the SC preferred women.295 For the second chambers, which
required at least 15 years of experience, the SC preferred men.296 This is
confirmed with the final distribution of gender. For the first chambers there are
11 women and 7 men, while for the second chambers the proportion is 9 women
and 11 men.
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FIGURE 5.1: DISTRIBUTION OF MEN BY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE (TOTAL)
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FIGURE 5.2: DISTRIBUTION OF MEN BY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE (APPOINTED)
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Regarding the origin of the education of candidates, the SC seemed to prefer
those candidates with academic degrees from Latin American and Europe.297
This could be explained by the fact that legal education in Colombia has
historically been influenced by traditions of continental law in countries like
France and Spain and by languages and cultural barriers.
FIGURE 6: DISTRIBUTION OF CANDIDATES AND APPOINTED JUDGES BY THE
ORIGIN OF THEIR LEGAL EDUCATION
Origing of education by gender for the Appointed judges
Other

15

PHD

5

10

5

Master degre

14

Specialization

6

1
10
17

4

2

University

28

Appointed j udges Women 0

Other

7

PHD

7

5

Master degre

2

6
10

Specialization

9
14

3

University

23
0

5

10
South America

15
Europe

20

25

30

35

North Ameri ca

Considering that academic experience played an important role in the
selection process, the data set built on the independent variable of publications
shows that the SC gave a lot of weight to female candidates that had leading
roles in their fields through their publications. For example, while only 24% of
the female candidates had published a legal book, 50% of the women who were
appointed to the SJP had published original legal research.298 The correlation
almost expands by a factor of 2 if we analyze those women who published
articles in journals (30% in the candidate data set to 55% in the appointed judges’
data set).299
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FIGURE 7.1: DISTRIBUTION BY TYPE OF PUBLICATIONS USED (TOTAL)
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FIGURE 7.2: DISTRIBUTION BY TYPE OF PUBLICATIONS USED (APPOINTED)
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While there was a clear effort made by the SC regarding the gender criteria,
the regional diversity criteria shows mixed results. If the data set of candidates
is compared with that of the appointed judges based on the region of birth
variable, we can see that the capital, Bogota, is heavily represented in the final
result, although there was an almost equal participation among the other
geographical regions of Colombia.300 However, the data seems to confirm one
of the problems regarding the access to the online platform. The low turnout in
the southern and pacific regions, traditionally poor areas with low Internet
coverage, showed that the SC failed to implement safeguards that promoted the
participation of lawyers that live in those areas. Taking into account that the
analysis suggests that the Commissioners were careful in maintaining the
regional distribution of the applicant pool, it can be argued that a higher
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participation of persons from these zones would have been reflected in a higher
participation in the final composition of the SJP.
FIGURE 8.1: DISTRIBUTION BY REGION OF ORIGIN (TOTAL)

TOTAL CANDIDATES
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FIGURE 8.2: DISTRIBUTION BY REGION OF ORIGIN (APPOINTED)
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This is confirmed if the analysis is made based on the variable of city of
birth. Here, we found that non-regional candidates who were born in the four
cities traditionally are favored because these places are considered the political
and economic centers of Colombia. Yet, the data set shows that the SC procured
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a strong representation of lawyers that did not come from those centers of
power.301
FIGURE 9.1: DISTRIBUTION BY CITY OF BIRTH (TOTAL)
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FIGURE 9.2: DISTRIBUTION BY CITY OF BIRTH (APPOINTED)
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Furthermore, when the data is tabulated with the variables of city of birth
(regional candidates are defined being born outside the four major cities) and
professional background, taking the whole universe of candidates, the charts
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show a strong homogeneity of the legal professionals in the country.302 This
could be interpreted as an obstacle that the SC had to confront in order to
guarantee a more diverse Court.
FIGURE 10.1: DISTRIBUTION OF CANDIDATES BY CITY OF BIRTH VERSUS
PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND (REGIONAL)
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FIGURE 10.2: DISTRIBUTION OF CANDIDATES BY CITY OF BIRTH VERSUS
PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND (NON-REGIONAL)
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However, a finding appears when the independent variables of regional
origin and expertise are isolated in an analysis of the SJP. While the results are
consistent with those of professional background in Figures 10.1 and 10.2, in the
case of candidates that were born in political or economic centers, the SC gave
more weight to lawyers with judicial experience.303 This might be explained by
the fact that, because of their location, these people had to solve more
complicated legal problems as judges of big urban centers.
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FIGURE 11.1: DISTRIBUTION OF APPOINTED JUDGES BY CITY OF BIRTH VERSUS
PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND (NON-REGIONAL)
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FIGURE 11.2: DISTRIBUTION OF APPOINTED JUDGES BY CITY OF BIRTH VERSUS
PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND (REGIONAL)
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Apparently, the SC applied a regional perspective to fulfil the formal
selection criteria of origin diversity included in the Peace Accord and the
Constitution. However, Figures 11.1 and 11.2 show that the SC did not fully
apply the regional criteria contemplated in the Peace Accord. When divided by
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days of work, regardless of their city of birth, a considerable number of SJP
judges have worked and lived the majority (more than 50%) of their lives in
Bogotá.304 This confirms that in a highly centralized country such as Colombia,
regional lawyers that want to advance in their careers must move to the capital
early in their lives. However, a question remains open in terms of the SJP
selection process because it is not clear if these lawyers can be considered as
true representatives of their regions, since they have been out of touch with the
perils of their communities. The regional diversity criteria were applied only
based on the city and region of birth of the candidate, but the SC could have
applied a higher standard of selection.
FIGURE 12.1: DISTRIBUTION OF CANDIDATES AND APPOINTED JUDGES BASED
ON THE PLACE WHERE THEY HAVE DEVELOPED THEIR LEGAL CAREER
(TOTAL)
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FIGURE 12.2: DISTRIBUTION OF CANDIDATES AND APPOINTED JUDGES BASED
ON THE PLACE WHERE THEY HAVE DEVELOPED THEIR LEGAL CAREER
(APPOINTED)
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Regarding ethnic criteria, the data set shows that indigenous communities
were more favored, proportionally, than African Colombians in the final
composition of the Tribunal. Also, Romani were not included in the final
composition.305 This does not necessarily mean that the SC consciously
discriminated against this community. A probable hypothesis is that while
indigenous and African Colombians lawyers are highly trained, Romani
attorneys did not have a proper legal education, showing a more structural
discrimination against them, not driven by the SC.
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FIGURE 13.1: DISTRIBUTION OF CANDIDATES AND APPOINTED JUDGES
REPRESENTING MINORITIES (TOTAL)
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FIGURE 13.2: DISTRIBUTION OF CANDIDATES AND APPOINTED JUDGES
REPRESENTING MINORITIES (APPOINTED)
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When Afro-Colombian lawyers are compared against the rest of the sample
it is clear the Committee tock a clear stand in favor of this community in the
selection process. While they only represented 3% of the candidate pool, AfroColombian judges represent 12% of the SJP306 their representation grew by a
factor of 4. In the case of the indigenous community the trend is clearer. Their
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representation grew by a factor of 8 based on the data set of all the candidates to
the SJP (1% of the pool of candidates compared to 8% of the appointed
judges).307
FIGURE 14.1: DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN COLOMBIAN CANDIDATES AND
JUDGES (TOTAL)
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FIGURE 14.2: DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN COLOMBIAN CANDIDATES AND
JUDGES (APPOINTED)
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FIGURE 15.1: DISTRIBUTION OF INDIGENOUS CANDIDATES AND APPOINTED
JUDGES (TOTAL)
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FIGURE 15.2: DISTRIBUTION OF INDIGENOUS CANDIDATES AND APPOINTED
JUDGES (APPOINTED)

Figure 16 represents a cross reference analysis between the ethnic variable
and the expertise variable. It shows that the Committee kept its general trend
regarding academic and private experience.308 However, in the case of AfroColombian candidates, it also gave weight to those with executive experience.309
And in the case of the indigenous community, it gave weight to lawyers with
legislative experience.310 This could be explained by the fact that, traditionally,
those in the indigenous community have been more successful in organizing at
a political level when running for public office as compared to AfroColombians, who have been less successful.311
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FIGURE 16: DISTRIBUTION OF APPOINTED JUDGES BY ETHNIC ORIGIN VERSUS
PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND
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Finally, regarding the way the SC qualified the military experience or
background of the candidates the data suggests that the Commissioners also
favor applicants that came from the Armed Forces. This can be concluded based
on the distribution presented in the figures below, which show that the
correlation between candidates and appointed judges with military experience
grew by a factor of 4.312 This could suggest that the critics exposed by Mrs.
Hamlet and Mrs. Horatio that stated that the SC did not try to guarantee a
balance distribution among the judges of the SJP, are not supported by the
evidence. However, based on the relation with other professions, it is not
possible to conclude that the Commissioners gave the same weight to the
military background as they did to other professions. This is so because the
sample of all the candidates with military backgrounds is very small (22)
compared with those candidates that had academic experience (860), judicial
experience (1505) or a background in the private sector (1224).313
The distributions displayed in this chapter suggest that the SC applied the
formal criteria in a rather consistent way. Women, minorities and candidates
born outside the capital outperformed others in the final stages of the process
and clearly have a measurably higher representation on the SJP. Also, the
interpretation made by the Commissioners of the rules of selection favor two
particular backgrounds—academia and private practice—over other
backgrounds that could be seen as more traditional for this type of court (in
particular, judicial experience).314 However, regarding the regional approach,
the data suggests that the SC applied very restrictive criteria to define those
candidates who could represent the regions.315 For members of the Commission
the only important condition was the region or city of birth. Yet, perhaps this
was due to the traditional structure of a legal career in Colombia, that
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concentrates success in the big cities and in the capital.316 This seems
contradictory, as the SJP is highly diverse regarding gender and ethnicity, but
not from the viewpoint of regional representation.
FIGURE 17.1: DISTRIBUTION OF MILITARY CANDIDATES AND JUDGES (TOTAL)
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The distributions showed in this chapter suggest that the SC applied the
formal criteria in a rather consistent way. Women, minorities and candidates
born outside the capital outperformed in the final stages of the process and
clearly have a measurable representation in the SJP.317 Also, it seems that the
interpretation made by the Commissioners of the rules of selection favor,
academia and private practice, over other backgrounds that could be seen as
more traditional for this type of court (in particular the judicial experience).318
However, regarding the regional approach, the data suggests that the SC applied
restrictive criteria to define those candidates who could represent the regions.319
For the members of the Commission the only important condition was the region
or city of birth. However, this was most likely a product of the traditional
structure of a legal career in Colombia, that concentrates success in the big cities
and in the capital. This seem paradoxical as the SJP is highly diverse regarding
gender and ethnicity but not from a viewpoint of regional representation.
CONCLUSION
“In this crazy war we are all perpetrators, some by their actions and others
by their silence.”320 This is a line that forms part of a gospel hymn chanted by
the Alabadoras de Bojayá—a group of African Colombian women that survived
the massacre of Bojayá—during the signing ceremony of a Peace Agreement
that ended a 50-year armed conflict between the Government and the Armed
Revolutionary Forces of Colombia.321 This Article analyzes a new process for
selecting the judges that are going to be in charge of judging the perpetrators, by
action or silence, of the civil war in Colombia.
Three main conclusions can be drawn from this quantitative and qualitative
analysis. The first conclusion relates to the personal impressions that the
interviewed stakeholders have in the process. The appointed judges have, in
general, a very positive view of the process. However, although they believe that
the digital mechanism designed by the SC guaranteed the transparency of the
process, they identified some obstacles related to interactions with the online
platform and the possibility of accessing it in all the regions of Colombia. This
first objection is more related to a generational gap with the use of technology
and the traditional system of appointing judges in Colombia that completely
disregards the application of new knowledge for the composition of the
judiciary. However, the observations related to platform access that displayed
by those judges who are ethnic minorities and live in isolated regions of the
country seems to be a major problem in the process. This situation worsened
because the SC did not implement the proper measures, due perhaps to
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budgetary or time constraints, to offer technical support to those candidates that
had problems uploading information due to their unreliable Internet connections.
This is an example of the paradoxical use of technologic advancements in
third world countries such as Colombia. On one hand, it has the capacity to
exponentially improve the transparency, efficiency and reliability of processes.
Yet, on the other hand, it consolidates social and economic gaps. It could be said
then that one of the lessons coming out of this process is that it is important to
include a space where applicants could receive tech support and be educated on
the use of digital tools. In this sense, the selection process not only creates an
incentive to participate but also reduces a tech breach between candidates that
clearly hinders the possibility of creating a plural and diverse Tribunal.
Despite some shortcomings, the use of an algorithm to qualify each one of
the formal criteria had the advantage of providing each Commissioner with a
common standard for evaluating all of the applicants. This allowed the work
inside the SC to be more efficient and reduced, at least before the creation of the
short list, the influence of any informal bias. Also, the fact that the majority of
the members of the SC lived and worked outside Colombia helped, by the mere
effect of the geographical distance, to limit any leverage a particular candidate
could have over the Commissioners. Also, according to the interviews, the
method applied by the SC, since the beginning, helped highlight that candidates
that by express disposition of the agreement, were to be favored in the process:
women, ethnic minorities and lawyers outside the capital.
However, it is not clear if, when cross-referenced, any of these criteria had
more weight than the others. The statistical correlation seems to suggest that
gender was a predominant factor. This is based evidence that the shift in the
distribution between women candidates and women judges was clearer than the
distribution based only on the ethnic and regional origin of the candidates. In
other words, although proportionally the shift in the changes between minority
candidates and regional candidates was numerically bigger, the final
representation of women was higher than that of every other criterion. This could
be explained by two factors that do not necessarily exclude each other. The first
one is that more women applied to the spots in the SJP than minorities and other
lawyers from the region. The other factor be that the Commissioners preferred
women. This preference would be a way to underline the advantages of the SJP
process over the more traditional way of appointing judges in Colombia that has
systematically underrepresented women in the judiciary.
Also, the rules and conditions for submitting an application to the SC
apparently had some gaps. For example, candidates self-reported, in an arbitrary
manner, the weight of their experience. This could have allowed some
candidates to misrepresent their backgrounds in order to adapt to the expertise
criteria put forward in the rules of selection. From the interviews, it is not clear
how the safeguards implemented by the administrative staff of the SC, by direct
instruction from the Commissioners, detected this type of anomaly. It is clear
that the SC took all the necessary measures to review the authenticity of the
applicant’s information. They did this by asking for particular certifications for
all the information uploaded by the candidates to the online platform. Yet, it
seems that the design of the process did not provide the proper measures to
review the validity of the percentages each candidate randomly assigned to their
experience.
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Nevertheless, the SC was capable of processing and reviewing the
considerable amount of information it received from the public in the form of
comments about the candidates. The rule that forbid anonymity in the process
was pivotal for this success. It served as an incentive against fake or poor-quality
information because people had to backup what they said with their identity. The
decision to keep the information secret and only available for the members of
the SC was a positive step toward promoting the participation of the public in
the process, especially regarding controversial applicants that could have
previously been involved in ethical or legal problems. The truth of the matter is
that neither the applicants, the media, nor other outside parties had access to
those comments and the information was never leaked to the public, even when
the webpage of the SC was attacked by hackers that sought to retrieve that
information.
The fact that some candidates used the public comments as a proselytizing
tactic was not seen favorably by the SC. It is not clear if this actually limited the
possibility of applicants being short-listed. The data collected only allows one
to correlate the formal criteria incorporated in the platform and this thesis only
offers a grasp on the decision-making process inside the SC. It is true that the
sole candidate not picked, who interviewed for this Article, admitted that he used
these tactics. Nonetheless, it is not possible to deduce from that any plausible
connection with the decision of the Commissioners to not include him on the
short-list of applicants. In sum, compared to the traditional appointment system
of other transitional courts in the world, the inclusion of public comments in the
selection process must be seen as a contribution of the Colombian model. For
the first time, candidates were subject not only to a bureaucratic scrutiny but to
a democratic evaluation of their CVs. Whether this could have an impact on the
legitimacy on the Tribunal remains to be answered. Though, this should be seen
as a decision that enhanced the transparency of the selection and as an additional
method to evaluate an applicant—especially if they hid relevant information
from the Commissioners.
The process for choosing the short-list was less clear. Among the
Commissioners, there was an agreement to choose two candidates per spots
available in the process; however, the final list of applicants who were called to
interview was 78. As opposed to the early stages of the process, this transition
seems to be unclear for the interviewed stakeholders. Although the online
platform allowed the SC to divide the candidates between an upper, middle and
lower tier, the information collected does not allow one to determine how the
final decisions were made. It is inaccurate to conclude that the reduction of the
applicant’s list was based on informal criteria or personal biases of the members
of the SC. But, due to the lack of formal rules in this part of the process, the SC
did not announce publicly its procedure to elaborate the short-list, and neither
the appointed judges nor the candidates knew about the “two candidates per
spot” rule. This is clearly a stage in the process where the standard of
transparency used rigorously by the SC in the first part of the process was not
entirely applied.
Overall, the stakeholders saw the interviews as another positive aspect of
the appointment process. The impression was that the members of the SC did
not treat the space as a mere formality. The dialogues and interactions that
occurred during the interviews had an impact on the final decision made by the
SC. However, from the interviews and the data collected it was not possible to
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grasp of how much weight this part had in the deliberations of the
Commissioners. From the interview with Commissioner Hemingway it seems
that the best interviewees were the ones who already occupied a place in the
upper tier of the pool of applicants. Do the interviews serve just as a confirmation
of the algorithm used by the SC in the first stage? Which statistical model could
be used to analyze the impact of the interviews? These are questions that remain
open.
This stage was not exempt of criticism. The fact that all the interviews were
conducted in Bogotá during a short period of time presented an obstacle for those
candidates who lived outside the capital. The short notification worsened the
situation for these applicants. The SC had to work under the restriction imposed
by the fact that three of their members were foreigners who lived outside the
country who worked ad hoc. Therefore, they could not be committed full-time
to the work of the SC. While the SC wanted to promote diversity in the SJP, the
way they organized applicant interviews contradicted this goal and actually had
the potential of reducing diversity.
Another circumstance raises the issue of the regional representation in the
Tribunal. Nominally, based on the data collected, only one-third of the appointed
judges were born in the capital. This could be seen as an achievement of the SC
in its intention of creating a more plural SJP. However, the data also revealed
that only 14 of the 51 judges actually had developed the majority of their
professional career outside the capital. This reality exposes some of the
limitations of the proxies used by the SC to define the regional origin of the
applicants. Also, it is a good example of the reality of the legal profession in the
country. The possibilities for social mobility are concentrated in a
disproportionate way in the capital. Because of this, attorneys, like many other
liberal professionals, have less opportunities for advancement in their regions
outside Bogotá. Can lawyers that were born outside the capital but have lived
and worked many years in it still be considered a regional representative? The
question remains open and maybe only the work of the Tribunal and the success,
or not, of applying a regional perspective in resolving its cases could eventually
offer an answer.
On the contrary, the data and the interviews regarding minorities showed
that there was a clear advantage for these communities in the selection process.
African-Colombian and indigenous representation in the Tribunal grew by a
factor of four and eight respectively, compared to the universe of candidates that
applied. Undoubetedly, this could be considered one of the successes of the SJP.
Using a traditional affirmative action approach, the SC was able to apply the
formal criteria that favored minorities. However, the distribution between
minorities was not equal. Afro-Colombians constituted the majority of those
representations by amounting to 60% of the appointed judges. It is not clear if a
parity rule should have been established to represent the spirit of the Peace
Accords in a more faithful way. However, the interviews may have revealed that
this was a contentious issue. Regarding the military, the data contradicts the
assumptions of those who opposed the Peace Accord. The correlation between
those candidates who had a military background and the appointed judges grew
by a factor of 4. However, it is true that this universe of candidates, compared to
other groups such as women for example, was extremely low. The majority of
the objections regarding the SC are related to its legitimacy. However, the fact
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that these opposing sectors did not actively participate in the process seems to
be a missed opportunity.
In conclusion, the application of the criteria gave proportionally more
weight to certain sectors (women, black, indigenous) in the final composition of
the Tribunal. Regardless of the fact that there were less candidates from these
communities, the Tribunal’s diverse make-up reflected the SC’s affirmative
action approach when choosing applicants from a more homogenous pool.
However, it remains unclear if the coalescence of the Court is strong. Further, it
is uncertain how that court has reacted to internal and external pressures, taking
into account that the Tribunal was founded in 2018, the same year the political
opposition to the Peace Agreement came to power in the presidential
elections.322 Also, internal divisions among former FARC commanders have
created high-level defections among its ranks.323
Gabriel García Márquez wrote in one of his most famous books that races
condemned to one hundred years of solitude did not have a second opportunity
on earth.324 The selection process, with its advancements and problems, offers a
unique experiment to understand how judges are appointed in the hopes of
breaking the violence loop Colombia has lived in for more than 50 years.
Empirical Legal Studies can contribute to finding an answer to this difficult
question. In other words, they could help find a second opportunity for
Colombia.
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